文獻探討研發競爭, 聚焦在比較不同動態路徑的研發競爭程度, 卻 忽略在一項產品只存在一種工程原理的架構下,不同路徑的社會福 利其實大同小異。本文探討新產品商品化(commercialization)的研 發競爭,在兩技術與兩模組的架構下,比較不同路徑的社會福利。路 徑1由小幅落後陷入大幅落後,路徑2由小幅落後追成勢均力敵。路 徑的福利決定於效率效果與利潤分散效果之間的拉鋸。路徑1看似 由一種技術壟斷商品市場很長一段時間, 研發競爭也看似低迷, 但 卻有高的效率效果與很低的利潤消散效果。路徑2的效率效果只有 中等, 又受到利潤消散效果的干擾,使其社會福利低於路徑1。

The literature discussing R&D competition focuses on the case of a single product technology and compares R&D intensity between various dynamic routes. However，the literature ignores the fact that the social welfare produced by the different routes is roughly equal. This paper explores a product commercialization R&D competition in which firms attempt to reduce the cost of a new product so it can be commercialized. The social welfare produced by two possible routes is compared assuming two technologies to provide a product consisting of two modules. On one path one firms leads in lowering the price of both modules and on the other each firm leads in lowering the cost of one module. This paper finds that the social welfare of a path is determined by the relative importance of the efficiency effect and the profit dissipation effect. On path one，there is weaker competition in R&D and the product market，but path one produces higher social welfare because it has both a higher efficiency effect and a lower profit dissipation effect.