面對一般對柏拉圖「理性主義」的刻板印象，這篇論文試圖論述：對柏拉圖而言，「慾望」本身具有價值。為進一步探討柏拉圖哲學中慾望和理性的關係，文中將以《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯的醫學談話，作為比較的對象。厄律克希馬可斯的「技藝」（τέχνη），即，希波克拉底派的醫學，符合柏拉圖早期對知識的要求，也就是：知識必須要能提出合理的說明；此外，當時的醫學是在藉由好慾望與壞慾望之間的平衡，而使人內在各成分達致健康與和諧。然而，這裡提出的解釋是：柏拉圖的哲學超出了理性科學或技藝的知識範本；在對慾望的處理上，他不依循醫學對慾望好壞的區分，他的和諧概念也保留了理性與非理性慾望並存的差異。柏拉圖哲學需要慾望的力量，慾望雖然可能變成非理性，卻也是靈魂追求哲學不可缺少的力量。

Confronted with the stereotype of a rationalistic Plato, the paper argues for the value of desire at its own right in Plato. To explore the relation between desire and rationality in Plato, I choose Eryximachus’ medicine in the Symposium as an object of comparison. Eryximachus’ τέχνη, representing the Hippocratic medical knowledge, is in conformity with Plato’s earlier requirement of knowledge, that is, giving a rational account. The medicine achieves the harmony by balancing the good and bad desires. Plato’s philosophy, however, goes beyond the epistemic model of rational science or τέχνη. On the treatment of desire, he does not follow the discrimination of good and bad desires in medicine, nor does he even out the different desire, because as the doctor. Plato’s philosophy needs the strength of desire, because—though desire sometimes becomes irrational—it is the vital strength of the soul to pursue philosophy.