提升企業資訊揭露的透明度，降低投資人資訊接觸的障礙，為政府推動公司治理改革的 重要方針。由公司董事會所主導的資訊揭露政策，正扮演著減緩資訊不對稱的機制。本 研究旨在探討董事會的組成及股權結構對年報資訊揭露水準的影響。實證結果顯示，不 論是強制性或自願性資訊揭露，均指出董事會獨立性愈強、董事會規模愈小、管理當局 持股比例愈高，企業報導的資訊揭露水準愈佳。此外，若將各項公司治理機制轉換融合 為單一衡量因子時，亦發現公司治理綜合指標分數愈高，公司資訊揭露的水準亦愈高。 同時，公司治理機制對資訊揭露性質的影響差異更反應在機構法人監督效果上。上述的 實證結論即使在過濾公司治理因子後或經由若干敏感度測試後仍然維持相當的穩定。

To narrow the information gap between managers and investors, the authorities concerned in Taiwan have called for greater corporate disclosure transparency and treated it as an important principle in the reform of corporate governance. It is held that corporate disclosure, if determined by the responsiveness of corporate boards, plays a significant role in mitigating information asymmetry. In this study, we examine the impact of board composition and ownership structure on information disclosure level in the annual report. The empirical results show that the more independent and smaller the board is, the higher the disclosure scores of corporate information are. In like manner, the higher the managerial ownership is, the higher the scores are. Following the percentile rank method, this study also finds that as the aggregate score of corporate governance mechanisms becomes higher, the level of corporate disclosure becomes better. Meanwhile, the differences that resulted from the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate disclosure types reveal the monitoring functions of the institutional investors. The results are robust, no matter whether the analysis is performed by filtering out corporate governance factors comprised in corporate disclosure or performed through some other sensitivity tests.