集體選擇的投票問題之一在於一個尋求個人投票以及制度設計間平衡的困境。為了解決這個困境，本文提出一AHP法的變型，稱之為AHP'法，其跨越了MAUT及AHP的界限並為有效的。AHP'可以用來解決隱藏在AHP的排序逆轉現象中因候選人退出所造成的投票困境。這個方法並不需要造成額外行政成本的新的制度設計，故而在真實選舉的情形中是可行的。

One of the voting problems in collective choice is a dilemma in which a balance must be struck between individual votes and institutional designs. In the present paper, we approach the dilemma by proposing a variant scaling technique of AHP, AHP', that is valid across MAUT and AHP. The voting dilemma due to abstention of candidates embedded in the rank reversal phenomenon of AHP can be resolved by AHP'. The technique does not require institutional design that may impose additional administrative costs, and thus is feasible in real election situations.