本文研究目的基於新制度經濟學分析中國大陸地方政府金融干預的行為。我們發現金融為中央政府的第二財政和中央政府的金融控制能力，構成地方政府金融干預的機會空間；而中央和地方財政關係以及地方官員晉升制度則形成地方政府金融干預的行為動機。八十年代地方政府擁有當地金融機構的人事權，可以直接干預當地金融機構。九十年代後，隨著中央政府增強財政和金融權力，地方政府則透過地方融資平台間接干預當地金融機構。

The purpose of this study is to analyze the behavior of local governments’ financial intervention in China based on the new institutional economic theory. We found that financial sector is the second finance of central government and the ability of the central government’s financial power, which structures the opportunity space of local governments’ financial intervention. The central-local fiscal relation and the promotion systems of local officials make the behavior motivation of local governments’ financial intervention. In the 80s, local governments have the right of personnel administration to directly intervene to local financial sectors. After 90s, with the strengthening fiscal and financial power of the central government, local governments indirectly intervened to local financial sectors through local government investment vehicles.