鼓勵外來直接投資政策是否隱含國家不願意運用武力來解決國家 間衝突的意涵？本文之目的在檢驗國家的提倡外資政策與其主動開啓 軍事衝突間的關聯。透過檢視國家的意向，本文認爲鼓勵外資政策隱 含國家傾向和平的意涵，這是由於下列兩點因素：首先、ー國的鼓勵 外資政策與其主動開啓軍事衝突無法相容，因爲後者將對國家吸引外 資的作爲帶來負面影響。其次，鼓勵外資政策通常標誌著國家對跨國 企業之較爲可信的承諾，以維繫和平的環境。由此，採行鼓勵外資政 策的國家較少會主動開啓軍事衝突。本研究透過1970年至2001年期 間的統計資料，分析鼓勵外資政策與國家開啓衝突間的關聯。研究結 果顯示，鼓勵外資的總體政策與國家發動衝突有統計顯著性的負面相 關。換言之，提倡外資政策具有減少國家主動開啓軍事衝突的促和效 果，亦可知鼓勵外資政策隱含國家具有較低衝突意願的傾向。

Are states with pro-FDI policies less conflict-prone? This paper examines plausible linkages between a state’s FDI promotion policy and its desire to initiate conflicts. By focusing on the willingness of the state, I argue that pro-FDI policy may reveal the state’s propensity to preserve peace for two reasons. First, pro-FDI policy is incompatible with conflict initiation since the negative effects of the latter offset the state’s efforts to increase FDI inflow by the former. Second, pro-FDI policy tends to be credible when it explicitly addresses the state’s commitments to multinationals. Hence, states undertaking pro-FDI policies are less likely to initiate conflict in general. By employing various pro-FDI policy indicators, I test the FDI-conflict initiation relationship at the monadic level from 1970 to 2001. Statistical results show that while macro-pro-FDI policies are negatively associated with conflict initiation, treaty-pro-FDI policies do not have the same effect. At both theoretical and empirical levels, this study advances the understanding of the FDI-conflict relationship by demonstrating the possible pacifying effects that pro-FDI policy might have on conflict initiation, and reveals that states with pro-FDI policy tend to be less conflict-prone.