2001 年成立的《金融控股公司法》， 為金融機構發揮經營綜合效益，提供合併 的法源基礎。一般研究大多關心金融控股 公司的經營綜效議題，但是從控股關係的 角度可以發現，大型金融家族集團的控股 鏈，在金融控股公司成立後，並沒有顯著 改變，但是控制家族選擇控制金融控股公 司的方式，卻會產生不同程度的資源依賴 關係與代理意涵。透過兩個個案的比較， 本文嘗試從資源依賴理論與代理理論觀點，瞭解金融家族集團在金融控股公司成立前後的股權控制方式，以進一步思考如何可以降低金融家族集團可能存在的代理問題。

The announcement of Financial Holding Company Act in 2001 provides a regulative situation to achieve the synergy among the financial institutions both in operation domains and resources. The efficiency and competitive advantages issues are the focus previously in financial holding company studies. However, observing the pyramidal ownership structure in those large financial family business groups that own the financial holding company, we can find that the share-holding relationships in the pyramidal ownership structure does not change dramatically after the family business group initiates the financial holding company in 2001. Moreover, the type of non-profit organizations that the controlling family chooses to serve as the shareholding instrument in the pyramidal ownership structure will generate differential resource dependence and agency implications. This study tries to utilize the case comparison method from the resource dependence theory and agency theory viewpoint to consider the share-controlled an d controlling role of financial holding company in large financial family business group in Taiwan. The findings will provide referable value in addressing family control issues in family business groups.