本文將以「知識的本質」與「知識的價值」為主軸，以「本 質問題」與「價值問題」為討論的核心，特別將專注於「Gettier難題」 與「淹沒難題」。由於這個研究是在知識的本質與價值這個主軸下進 行，所以當我們面對本質與價值問題時，我們意味著「知態的本質」 與「知態的價值」：也就是我們把知識當作是一種成就，或者是一種 由人類認知能力所獲致的成功，而不只是一種運氣或偶然所得到的 結果，我們將著重這種成就與認知成功本身的價值所在。這個研究 的最終目標是希望，在我們為Gettier難題與淹沒難題尋求回應的同 時，也能為知識的本質問題，以及有關知識價值的相關難題，都能 提供一個令人滿意的解決途徑與方案。 有關知識本質與價值的問題，一個最直接與最普遍的問題在於： 「什麼是知識？」與「什麼是知識的價值？」這兩個問題。伴隨著這 兩個普遍問題而來的，是在不同序列所出現的本質與價值問題。其 中包括知識本質與價值的主要問題：如果知識並不等同於真信念， 那麼知識是什麼？知識如何能比僅僅只是真的信念還要有價值？接 下來要問的是第二序的知識本質與價值問題：知識如果不等同於證 成的真信念，那麼知識是什麼？為什麼「知識」比起「那些近乎於知 識卻又禁不起Gettier反例測試的真信念」還要有價值？最後還有第三 序的問題：為什麼知識具有優先性與不可定義性？為什麼「知識」比 起「那些近乎於知識卻又禁不起Gettier反例測試的真信念」不僅具有 更高的價值，而且還具有其自身獨特或最終的價值？本文希望能夠 釐清這些不同序列的知識本質與價值問題，同時也能展現這些不同 問題的哲學意涵。 本文的真正核心問題在回答：「什麼是德性知識論？」這個問題。透過鋪陳知識的本質與知識的價值問題，我們一方面可以掌握Sosa 的德性知識論在當代知識論發展過程中的獨特地位，另一方面也可 以看出回應本質問題與價值問題的最新創見。

What is knowledge? Why is knowledge valuable? In what way is knowledge more and better than merely true belief? This is a primary nature and value problems posed in Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus. This paper focuses upon the nature problem and value problem of knowledge, especially upon “the Gettier problem” and “the swamping problem”，which are the central problems in the new value-driven epistemology. It is hoped that a general solution to the Gettier problem and the swamping problem can be found, and that the nature problem and the problem regarding the value of knowledge in epistemology will be satisfactorily addressed. There are different levels of suspicion concerning the nature and the value of knowledge, beginning with the most general suspicion that knowledge has any nature and any distinctive value at all. It then follows with the primary concern that why knowledge is more and better than merely true belief, the secondary concern that why knowledge is not justified true belief and why knowledge is more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge, and the tertiary concern that why knowledge cannot be defined and why knowledge has not just a greater degree but also a different kind of value than whatever falls short of knowledge. This paper also attempts to explore what those different levels of suspicions or the nature and value problems of knowledge really involve, and to show the philosophical significances of them. As we shall see, the question regarding “what virtue epistemology is” plays a central role in this paper. By exploring the nature problem and the value problem of knowledge, not only can we grasp the unique position of Sosa’s virtue epistemology in the current development of epistemology, but also get a clear perspective of facing the nature problem as well as the value problem.