本文分兩個部分。第一部分討論賴爾在事實知識與技藝 知識之間的區分’其重點是要說明’這種區分並沒有窮盡不同的知 識。儒家的道德知識，即德性之知或良知，雖然同時是事實知識和 技藝知識，但卻還包含了為這兩種知識所沒有包含的成分：促使一 個人根據這樣的知識行動的自然傾向。這就引出了本文第二部分要 討論的問題。在休謨主義者看來，儒家的道德知識實際上混淆了兩 個不同的心理狀態：信念與欲望。而本部分要論證的重點是，儒家 的道德知識所涉及的是包含了信念與欲望的同一個心理狀態。而且 由於這個心理狀態所包含的信念不是描述性的，而是規範性的，它 同這個心理狀態所包含的欲望一樣，與世界的適合方向是從心靈到 世界，即當其與世界不符時，我們不是去改變這個心理狀態，使之 與世界一致，而是去改變世界，使之與這個心理狀態一致。因此， 良知或德性之知作為同時包含了信念和欲望的單一的心理狀態，即 信念一欲望，並非如休謨主義者所說的那樣是怪物。

This paper is divided into two parts. Part I discusses the Confucian idea of moral knowledge in the context of Ryle’s classical distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how, showing that while Confucian moral knowledge does includes both knowing-that and knowing-how (which also indicates that these two are not separate), it also has something not included in either of the two types of knowledge: inclination to act accordingly. This introduces the issue to be discussed in Part II of this paper. Contemporary Humeans would regard Confucianism as confused in regarding inclination to act, which is basically an element of desire, as part of knowledge, which appears as belief, since desire and belief are two entirely different mental states with the opposite directions of fit with the world. Part II shows that there can be a single mental state, that of “besire,” that includes both belief and desire and Confucian moral knowledge is precisely one example of such a besire. In this Confucian besire, since the belief is a normative belief, which is different from the descriptive belief, its direction of fit with the world is consistent with the direction of fit between the desire and the world: from the mind to the world. So besire is not bizarre as claimed by contemporary Humeans.