在羅爾斯著的《萬民法》裡依然充滿爭議的是，自由的容忍度應該延伸到非自由的上層人民的主張。根據羅爾斯的說法，非自由的上層人民同樣會認同由自由人民所申明的人民法，因此，前者在人類社會中可以被視為是擁有良好信譽的成員。世界自由主義者認為羅爾斯概念中的國際容忍度偏離了自由主義的主軸，對他們來說，唯有自由的社會才符合容忍度的標準。以下提出了三點議題進行精確的詳述：一、針對羅爾斯使用的原始位置裝置，二、羅爾斯對於何謂得體的人權之標準，三、在本書中羅爾斯聲稱非自由的上層人民與完全自由的人民都會認同的人民法是建立在一個不完全的自由主義原則之上。在此篇論文中，我會從世界主義針對羅爾斯國際容忍度的概念之批判進行檢視。我的個人主張是，羅爾斯派的容忍度概念不僅可以通過世界主義對其的質疑，甚至可以說是更加真實也更具重要性的自由主義架構。我會試圖將這本書的概念轉化成一個具原則性的結果主義產物之下的自由主義方案。根據以上的解讀方式，我們可以理解以長遠的角度來看，羅爾斯派中針對容忍度的概念，不僅需要自由主義原則作為基礎，更有助於理解自由在社會中的長遠價值。

It is a controversial claim in John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples that liberal toleration should extend to non-liberal decent peoples. According to Rawls, non-liberal decent peoples will agree on the same Law of Peoples affirmed by liberal peoples, and are thus to be recognized as members in good standing in the Society of Peoples. Cosmopolitan liberals charge Rawls’s notion of international toleration with being distant from the core liberal commitments. For them, only societies that are liberal in character meet the criteria for toleration. Specifically, they take issue with 1) Rawls’s use of the original position device, 2) Rawls’s human rights criteria for decency, and 3) the less than fully liberal principles of the Law of Peoples that Rawls claims would be agreed upon by liberal peoples and decent non-liberal ones. In this thesis, I will examine the cosmopolitan criticisms against Rawls’s conception of international toleration. I argue that Rawlsian toleration is not only defendable from the cosmopolitan charge, but also substantiable within a genuinely liberal framework. I will provide an interpretation of the Law of Peoples as a “principled consequentialist” liberal project. Based on this interpretation, a Rawlsian notion of toleration is not only required by the commitment to fundamental liberal principles, but also conducive to the realization of liberal values across societies in the long term.