本論文試圖重新理解呂格爾詮釋學中「後黑格爾康德風格」的涵義，並說明這個風格不應該僅是被理解為回到康德，而必須被理解為超越康德和黑格爾的企圖。更具體地說，本論文提出兩個澄清呂格爾「後黑格爾康德風格」的路徑。首先，從黑格爾到康德：呂格爾批評黑格爾的「歷史哲學」對歷史意識的存有神學解釋，以「神正論」解消了惡的問題，而轉向康德《單純理性界限內的宗教》。第二，從康德到黑格爾：呂格爾不滿意康德對「道德性」（Moralität）的解釋，而引入黑格爾的「倫理生活」（Sittlichkeit）概念。然而，在引入「倫理生活」概念時，呂格爾改變了黑格爾的原義，在他的中介過程中，絕對精神消失了；取而代之的是，亞里斯多德的「審思決斷」（phronèsis）被引入對實踐理性的反省。「後黑格爾康德風格」反映了呂格爾詮釋學中對自由的關切。

This paper attempts to rework the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) in terms of a “post-Hegelian Kantian style”. It argues that the Ricoeurian hermeneutics should not be reduced to merely a return to Kant; instead, it must be understood as an ambition to surpass both Kant and Hegel. This paper clarifies two lines of interpretation that have developed Ricoeur’s “post-Hegelian Kantian style”. First, to move from Hegel to Kant – criticizing the onto-theological explanation of historical consciousness in Hegel’s historical philosophy, which neutralizes evil with theodicy, Ricoeur is prompted to make a return to Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Second, to move from Kant to Hegel – unsatisfied with the Kantian conception of Moralität, Ricoeur re-introduces Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit, as the latter foregrounds the importance of intersubjectivity which structures the experiences of any groups such as the family, the civil society or the state. However, in order to effectuate the operational purposes of the concept of Sittlichkeit, Ricoeur has to modify the meaning of the term; and in the process of Ricoeur’s mediation, it can be seen that the Absolute Reason disappears, whereas Aristotle’s notion of phronèsis is re-introduced into Ricoeur’s reflection on practical reason. The “post-Hegelian Kantian style” implies a deep concern of freedom in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.