在Ernest Sosa的德性知識論中有兩項基本的要義：第一項是把知識定義為適切的信念；第二項是區分動物知識與反省知識。本文將指出德性知識論提供給我們一個面對與回答Gettier難題與價值難題的嶄新進路與合理方式，而這兩個難題長久以來一直糾纏著許多的哲學家。無可諱言，這是德性知識論對當代知識論最大的貢獻之一。然而，不幸的是，如果我們追隨這個進路並仔細思考其中的主張，我們將發現新的本質問題與價值問題又會出現在德性知識論的理論之中，特別是Sosa所主張與提議的「反省知識」，將難以避免地重新面對這兩個新的難題，這也是本文將論證的重點所在。

There are two important tenets of (Ernest Sosa’s) virtue epistemology: one is the idea that knowledge is apt belief, the other is the claim that there is a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. The approach of virtue epistemology helps us find a way out to both of the Gettier problem and the value problem (in its traditional version and its contemporary counterpart), both problems have been bothering epistemologists in the field for long time. Unfortunately, I will point out and argue in this paper, if we follow this approach, we will face a new nature problem as well as a new value problem of knowledge. Both of the problems come from some reflections on the alleged reflective knowledge deeply seated in Sosa's virtue epistemology.