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哲學與文化 A&HCICSSCI

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篇名 荀子與德性知識論
卷期 41:3=478
並列篇名 Xunzi and Virtue Epistemology
作者 蔡政宏
頁次 121-142
關鍵字 智識之德Ernest Sosa天君天官解蔽Intellectual VirtueErnest SosaTian Jun Tian Guan Dispelling BlindnessA&HCI
出刊日期 201403

中文摘要

調控智德知識論主張智識之德可以調整與指引認知者的知態行動,並且提高知態行動的品質。對調控智德知識論者而言,智識之德可加以培養,且當智識之德的品質愈高,所產出的知態行動的品質也會愈高。調控智德知識論者所說的智識之德一般是指「品格之德」(例如智識上的勇氣與開放心靈)而非「官能之德」(例如視覺與聽覺),因為他們認為官能之德是無法培養的。本文試圖以荀子哲學為範例,闡釋以官能之德為核心概念的調控智德知識論如何可能。若此闡釋成功,則一方面為當代智德知識論顯示出可隸屬於其中的新支派,另一方面也為荀子的知識觀點建立起一清晰理論架構並進而突顯出其知識觀點的特徵。

英文摘要

Regulative virtue epistemology argues that intellectual virtues can adjust and guide one’s epistemic actions as well as improve on the quality of the epistemic actions. For regulative virtue epistemologists, intellectual virtues can be cultivated to a higher degree; when the quality of intellectual virtue is better, the resulting quality of epistemic action is better. The intellectual virtues that regulative epistemologists talk about are character virtues (such as intellectual courage and open-mindedness) rather than faculty virtues (such as sight and hearing), since they don’t think that faculty virtues could be cultivated. This article refers to Xunzi’s philosophy, explaining how a regulative faculty-based virtue epistemology is possible. If this explanation works, on the one hand, a new branch of contemporary virtue epistemology is shown, and, on the other hand, a clear theoretical framework of Xunzi’s epistemology is constructed.

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