在胡塞爾那裡，現象被規定為顯現與顯現者的統一。其中顯現又具有雙重含義：一方面它是顯現者的自身顯現，另一方面它又是主體對事物的意識：因為事物是通過主體的意識而顯現。因此在胡塞爾那裡，顯現者的自身顯現同時就是其通過意識的顯現。列維納斯改造了胡塞爾的現象定義：他把事物通過我的意識的顯現與事物據其自身而進行的自身顯示嚴格區分開，並只將以前一種方式顯現的事物稱為現象。在他看來，面容就是自身顯示而非現象。但本文認為，面容作為自身顯示也是一種自身被給予性，因此在一種更原本的意義上也是現象。由此，列維納斯便突破了胡塞爾的現象概念，也開出了以現象學的方式言說絕對他者的可能性。

In Husserl’s phenomenology, “phenomenon” is defined as the unification of appearing (apparition) and that which appears. The appearing has two meanings: on the one hand, it is the self-appearance of that which appears; on the other, it is my consciousness of something that appears to me, for it is always in my consciousness that something can appear to me. Thus, in Husserl’s phenomenology, the manifestation of that which appears is precisely the apparition through consciousness. Levinas modifies Husserl’s definition of phenomenon. He strictly distinguishes the manifestation of things through itself from that through my consciousness, and only takes the latter as a phenomenon. Levinas regards the face as a manifestation through itself but not as a phenomenon. However, as a self-manifestation, face is a kind of self-givenness; in this sense, it is also a kind of phenomenon. In this way, Levinas has made a breakthrough of Husserl’s concept of phenomenon, and therefore, on the basis of the face, has created the possibility of speaking the absolute other in phenomenology.