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臺北大學法學論叢 TSSCI

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篇名 公司出售時之受託義務與程序機制-美國德拉瓦州案例法之考察
卷期 95
並列篇名 Fiduciary Duty and Procedural Mechanism in Sale of Company: Review of Delaware Case Laws
作者 黃朝琮
頁次 099-194
關鍵字 企業併購受託義務忠實義務RevlonWeinberger獨立委員會外部股東多數決MFW經營判斷法則特別委員會Merger and AcquisitionFiduciary DutyDuty of LoyaltyIndependent CommitteeMajority Vote of Unaffiliated ShareholdersBusiness Judgment RuleSpecial CommitteeTSSCI
出刊日期 201509

中文摘要

公司出售所生之企業併購交易因將造成公司體質的重大變化,如何維 持各方利害關係人間權利義務的平衡,乃公司法上之重要課題。此對股東 固屬其財產權利之行使與保障,至關重大,對於出售公司之董事與收購方 而言,如何有一套可資遵循之遊戲規則,減少過程中之不確定性並避免可 能的法律責任,亦屬關鍵。 德拉瓦州案例法下之公司出售法制,係以受託義務(fiduciary duty) 概念為其核心,而以忠實義務及注意義務為內涵,形成 Revlon 及 Weinberger 兩大案例法系統,並發展出獨立委員會及外部股東多數決兩大 主要程序機制,而根據不同程序機制之使用,調整所應適用之受託義務審 查規則,晚近在 In re MFW Shareholders Litigation 及 Kahn, et al. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., et al. 中,德拉瓦州法院宣示,在併用獨立委員會及外部 股東多數決的場合,法院將採取經營判斷法則審查控制股東收購行為之適 法性,此一發展。值得關注。我國適逢企業併購法制修正之際,將要求公 開發行公司設立特別委員會審議併購交易之公平性及合理性,我國公司法 因亦課予公司負責人受託義務,故以上德拉瓦州案例法之發展將可作為思 考素材,以為建構我國企業併購法制之參考。

英文摘要

Considering the fundamental change brought to a company in the sale of the company or the like merger and acquisition deal, it is one of the critical issues in the corporate law to balance the rights and obligations among interested parties in the event of a merger. This is concerned with the protection of shareholders as well as the need of the directors and buyers to have a set of clear rules so as to reduce the liability risk. Delaware case laws premise the law of sale of company on the concept of fiduciary duty, whose substance is comprised of duty of loyalty and duty of care, formulating the two mainstream case laws of Weinberger and Revlon. It further develops the idea of the two procedural mechanisms, independent committee and majority vote of unaffiliated shareholders, and applies different standard of review according to the procedural mechanism adopted. Lately, in the In re MFW Shareholders Litigation and Kahn, et al. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., et al., the Delaware courts render that it will scrutinize the freeze-out merger by the controlling shareholder under business judgment rule if both independent committee and majority vote of unaffiliated shareholders are applied. The current draft of Taiwan Merger and Acquisition Act purports to, in the event of a merger and acquisition deal, demand listing companies to form special committee to review the fairness and reasonableness of that deal. Because Taiwan Company Act also imposes the fiduciary duty on a company’s representative, the development of Delaware case laws provide inspiring guidance to establish the law of mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan.

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