日本政府分別於2001 年與2009 年兩度改革預算制度，都是在內閣層級 設立新的組織，移轉部分預算編列權限到內閣，希望透過改變編列預算的方 式，來提高首相與內閣領導力，並解決各省廳的本位問題。前者是在內閣府 設立經財政諮詢會議，後者則是分別在內閣官房與內閣府設立國家戰略室與 行政刷新會議。儘管小泉內閣時期，透過經濟財政諮詢會議改革原有的預算 編列方式，也成功地刪減財政支出，以及民主黨執政初期，行政刷新會議做 出刪減預算的決定，國家戰略室也有設定降低財政赤字的目標，但是整體來 說，兩次改革效果有限。本文採用歷史制度論為研究途徑，檢證經濟財政諮 詢會議、國家戰略室以及行政刷新會議的實際運作，以理解預算制度變遷的 背景與過程，以及為何兩次預算改革效果有限。

The Japanese government reformed its budget institutions and budget processes in 2001 and 2009, establishing the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy（CEFP）in 2001, and the National Strategy Office（NSO）and the Government Revitalization Unit（GRU）in 2009. By moving the Ministry of Finance’s budget formulation authority to the Cabinet, it was expected that these new institutions would facilitate the prime minister’s leadership. However, despite institutional changes, the budget formulation processes and the existing power relations among actors in the budget processes have remained much of the same. With particular focuses on how the CEFP, NSO, and GRU operated, this paper adopts historical institutionalism to investigate the evolution of budget institutions in Japan, and explain why the reform effects have been limited.