1947 年5 月，國共內戰中的山東戰場孟良崮戰役，國軍精銳部隊整 編第七十四師被人數佔優勢的共軍圍攻，全軍覆沒。此役中擁有指揮權的 陸軍總司令顧祝同（1893-1987）誤判軍情，又忽略前線部隊準確的情報， 錯失救援時機，是國軍慘敗的重要因素。相對於此，蔣中正（1887-1975） 越級指揮與最高統帥部是否洩露情報，並非關鍵。國軍前線部隊執行作戰 計畫的軍事行動之初，共軍已從戰場情勢中確認整編第七十四師的行動， 祕密集結主力，伺機而動，在該師冒進、脫離與友軍互援後，切斷雙方聯 繫。該師遭遇共軍強烈抵抗，撤至不利防守的孟良崮，又因顧祝同救援遲 緩與友軍可能敷衍救援，導致該師被圍殲。 在5 月12-16 日數日戰役期間，前線指揮官顧祝同比蔣中正更快獲得 情報，也擁有下令部隊迅速馳援的指揮權，此是蔣顧二人的共識。該師撤 至孟良崮的關鍵時刻，蔣中正仍樂觀以為此攻勢作戰可以殲滅共軍。然 而，顧祝同的判斷錯誤，救援行動延遲一天，致使該師全軍覆沒。蔣雖在 5 月16 日直接下達救援命令給各兵團與整編師，為時已晚。

During the Battle of Menglianggu in Shandong, the highly elite 74th Organized Division of the Nationalist Army was outnumbered by Communist forces, and was eventually eliminated on May 1947. The command authority of the Nationalist Army for this battle was vested in Gu Zhutong, who made erroneous interpretations of intelligence reports, ignored more accurate reports from front line troops, and thus lost the opportunity to effect rapid support, all of which constituted major factors in the Nationalist Army’s heavy losses. However, Chiang Kai-Shek’s information came from Gu, and when that division retreated to Menglianggu and the battle was in its critical stage, Gu made erroneous interpretations of field intelligence, and delayed support operations by one day, resulting in the entire division is being eliminated. Although Chiang directly issued support orders again to all army groups and organized divisions, it was too late.