透過國内外與軍公敎退休基金管理相關之研究可以瞭解，基金投資確實能有效提昇 一個國家產業的發展。隨著新興市場的不斷開發，基金管理依委託經營模式進行已形成 一股潮流與趨勢；從基金委託經營管理模式在美國執行後的優異成效可知，基金本身不 但能有穩定的收益，而且更促進了產業的升級與市場資金的流動，故其實為一國經濟發 展的強心針。深入探討如何將我國公務人員退休撫卹基金進行適當的委託經營，在我國 經濟發展中是具有重要意涵。委託經營發展於我國雖僅起步，但如能學習歐美成功的經 驗與落實有關制度的建立，必將能有效達到分散風險與提高經營績效之雙重目標。退撫 基金管理中存在著雙重委託代理關係，本研究擬運用赛局與資訊經濟等相關理論，來研 究代理人與委託人之間的赛局關係；同時，在納入考慮退撫基金的特殊性前提下修訂基 礎的經典模型，在委託人與代理人的效用函數中引進適合的參數，建構出一退撫基金的 委託經營管理代理模型。此外，本研究亦將提出運用剩餘索取權來克服逆向選擇與道德 風險等代理問題，使績效達法定收益率或是代理風險最小化等目的，以提供退休撫卹基 金會之決策參考。

he designated management of Public Service Pension Funds will promote the economic development of a country. The management and performance of these funds not only affect their income stability , but also the industry upgrading and fund flows. There exists a double Principal-Agent problem in managing the Public Service Pension Funds. Based on the Principal-Agent theory and the characteristics of Public Service Pension Funds, we will investigate the game between principals and agents in this research. We propose a modified principal-agent model for the designated management of Public Service Pension, by introducing appropriate parameters into the utility function in the classical principle-agent model and propose a modified utility function. Such utility function could be used to specify how much utility a principle gets for a particular designated management. Besides, residual claim could be used to solve the principars adverse selection and the agent5s moral hazard problems.Our results could provide the Public Service Pension Funds useful information to make decisions.