善意理解原則（the principle of charity）是政治思想史學者廣為採用的詮釋原則之 一，其目的在發現政治思想文本作者的原意，以比較不同詮釋的高下對錯。在第一部 分， 本文透過羅賓． 柯靈烏（R.G. Collingwood, 1889-1943 ） 、昆丁． 斯基爾 （Quentin Skinner, 1940-）、李奧．施特勞斯（Leo Strauss, 1899-1973）三位重要學者 的討論，說明此原則的基本意涵。本文以拼圖及神喻為例進一步說明，一方面指出善 意理解原則其實是文本一致性的原則；這一致性原則不一定是文本論證邏輯的一致， 也可能是寫作風格或者是文本與歷史脈絡的一致。但另一方面，本文也強調文本詮釋 的複雜難測。在第二個部分，本文討論，應用善意理解原則時，可能面對的三個困 難：排它性，限制讀者的批判自由，以及無法確定作者的原意。本文指出，在適當運 用的條件下，善意理解原則並不會對讀者的批判自由造成嚴重限制，但對於其他兩個 問題，則無法有同樣妥善的解決之道。本文結論，讀者應該接受文本詮釋的多元與歧 異；善意理解原則幫助我們建構文本的意義；但是，我們應同時留意此一原則造成的 影響與限制。

The principle of charity is widely applied in the study of political thought for finding authorial intention. This paper examines the uses of this principle and its limits through the discussion of R.G. Collingwood, Quentin Skinner, and Leo Strauss. The interpretation of texts, like playing a jigsaw puzzle without knowing the final picture or deciphering the oracles of Delphi, is a highly complicated process. The principle of charity is, broadly speaking, a principle of textual consistency. The consistency may be logical, stylish, or historical. This paper discusses three practical problems that might occur in the application of the principle: its exclusiveness, its limitation of the reader’s freedom of criticism, and most serious of all, its inadequacy in deciding authorial intention. We find that the principle of charity does not constitute a serious limitation on the reader’s freedom of criticism when used properly; however, there seems to be no suitable solution to the other two problems. We conclude that the multiplicity and diversity of textual interpretations should be appreciated; the principle of charity is useful in constructing the meaning of a text; but readers should be aware of its limits.