康德有「內在自由」與「外在自由」的區分，又由此而有「德性義務」與「法權義務」之不同。德性義務要求人行為的動機純粹，要為了義務而行，而法權義務則只考慮行為的外表的合法性。此一分別對於重德的中國文化或中國社會，如何從重德的要求轉出重法治的精神，似乎可以給出一個重要的提示。即雖重德而要求自己符合德性義務是必要的，但對於別人的行動則可以先從行為是否合法來看，不必太注重其念慮是否純正。念慮之是否純正是個人要求自己之事，只有在人從事深刻的內省時，才能明白。此一分疏，對於清儒戴震有名的對宋儒義理的抗議，即「以理殺人」之說，應可給出一合理的解答。從人的行動的外表是否合法來看人，是尊重人有其抉擇的自由，這應該是社會能夠健康發展的一個基礎；而這種抉擇的自由也可以上通至道德意志的超越的自由，從此一角度，也可以探索內聖與外王、德治與法治的關係。

Kant made a distinction between “internal freedom” and “external freedom”, and he thereafter illustrated the difference between “duty of Virtue” and “duty of Right” on the basis of it. What duty of Virtue requires is pure motivation of an action, which means “to act only for the sake of duty”. What duty of Right requires is the legality of an action. The above-mentioned distinction may be an important line for Chinese culture or society with high emphasis on virtue to transform its original attitude into emphasizing the spirit of “rule with law”. That is, although it is necessary for us to require ourselves to act only for the sake of duty of Virtue, instead of equally requiring others, we may first judge whether their actions are legal or not. Only through profound self-reflection, someone may be conscious of whether his motivation of action is pure or not. In other words, demanding the purity of a motivation of acting only for the sake of duty belongs to self-disciplined territory. I believe the clarification on duty of Virtue and Right may give a reasonable response to the famous critique of “killing in the name of justice” made by Dai Zhen, Confucianist of the Qing dynasty, to criticize Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. To judge people based on the legality of their external behaviors is in deference to their freedom of choice, which should be the foundation for a sound society. Such freedom may also be understood as the transcendental freedom, and through this aspect we can clarify the relationship between “inward cultivation” and “outward governance”, between “rule with virtue” and “rule with law”.