布希的外交政策是否為革命性創舉，又是否與柯林頓時代的政策背道而 馳，這些問題已經在學界成為辯論的焦點。在各種爭議中，少有的一項共識在 於911事件改變了布希對威脅來源的看法，也改變了他對中國的定位，把中國 從原本的威脅美國利益與安全的競爭者轉而視為可以共創和平的戰略夥伴。本 文主張上述看法有其謬誤，布希在911之前所採取的單邊主義並不適用於中 國，在911後繼續採取的單邊主義，也不適用於中國。不論在911之前或之後， 即使在言語上或觀念上對中國懷有敵意，但布希在實際作為上一貫地對中國採 取避免衝突的態度，本質上延續了柯林頓的中國政策，即擴大與中國的交往與 合作，降低緊張關係，減少衝突。本文認為美國過去廿多年來的中國政策，在 務實與偏離務實之間不斷試誤形成了一種框架，它限制了布希政府對於中國政 策難有革命性的作為，而美國總統的競選模式可以解釋那些試誤為何不斷發 生。

The question of whether President George W. Bush's foreign policies are a radical departure from Clinton's has been a focus of debate. One of the rare agreements is that the September 11 attacks produced an acute sense of U.S. vulnerability and forced President Bush to change his confrontational policy toward China. This paper shall argue that prior to September 11, the Bush administration had abandoned the view of China as a “strategic competitor•” Bush essentially followed Clinton^ China policy with minimal adjustment. The reason why Bush changed his China policy in a relatively short period of time, the paper shall argue, is the impact of U.S. foreign policy heritage anfl the result of trial and error.