原則上，為平衡會員體之主權要求及WTO爭端機制之效率，WTO爭端 程序的設計，包括DSU第21.5條有關履行裁決之爭議、以及DSU第22.6條 有關報復程度之爭議等，係以「彈性」為其考量重點，一則在於降低WTO會 員體主權與爭端機制監督權之間的爭競，維繫爭端機制之可信度，二則在於使 WTO會員得藉由靈活的程序運用解決爭端，減少WTO資源的浪費。但以上 爭端機制的彈性設計於歐體的香蕉案中受到空前的挑戰。除了歐體有計晝的 以時間換取空間策略，藉由重複性的救濟程序作為杯葛履行dsb裁決的手 段之外，DSU第21.5條及DSU第22.6條的程序衝突亦首度於香蕉案中呈 現，該問題的癥結在於DSU本身彈性機制的設計缺陷。其中DSU第21.5 條與DSU第22.6條的審理時程以及程序啟動之時間點的設計缺陷、與該兩 項爭議未指定統一的爭端審理管道等設計，將為DSU爭端機制的運作埋下 不定時炸彈。未來以該等程序問題技術杯葛執行的狀況，是否可能進一步 被運用作為削弱對手國產業競爭力之手段，值得密切觀察。

The procedure of WTO dispute settlement mechanism is basically designed on the considerations of “flexibility”. The EOBananas case has posted a great challenge to the Dispute Settlement mechanism. EC resisted complying with appellate body’s recommendations and rulings，by means of the dispute procedure pursuant to article 21 and 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, for more than 3 years after the expiration of the implementation period. The EC-Bananas case showed that loosing parties are possible to delay the reasonable period of time via the procedural conflict between article 21.5 and article 22.6 of the DSU. This article concludes that the Great Powers, such as USA, EU and Japan, could boycott the implementation of DSB5s recommendations and rulings via WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. But the weak countries could not counter the strong states5 demands because they lack the sufficient resources to take benefits from the WTO dispute settlement mechanism