在討論胡塞爾有關政治議題的著作中，有從政治管理技術化的問題切入者，也有具體從胡塞爾對於戰爭的立場來切入者，更有從社群的概念切入者。本文探討胡塞爾的政治哲學會涉及到這三個問題，而採取的步驟是首先對三部具代表性的二手文獻作詮釋與整理，試著從其一藉胡塞爾現象學去反省政治管理技術的發生學意義，連接到其二經由現象學的還原獲得該發生學意義的根源，並視之為原初「政治之物」，再對其中所蘊含的「愛的社群」理念連接到其三據此作為建立國家理想的依據。本文第二部分將對這些論述做一評論。此外，本文在字裡行間將提出這個問題：胡塞爾以現象學為嚴格的科學，主要在發展出純粹的現象學，而作為一種實務科學的政治學是否在胡塞爾現象學中具一席之地？如同其他學科像倫理學一樣，它又如何與純粹的現象學有著適當的關係？本文試著將此放在胡塞爾現象學的一個關鍵問題來解決：超驗的態度和自然的態度如何協調？是否現象學的懸置方法對此有因應之道？鑒於此，我們也將看到，胡塞爾的這種超驗和自然態度間的關係也發生在鄂蘭的政治哲學裡面，這表示鄂蘭也在其政治思想裡採用了懸置的方法。然而，若我們鑒於胡塞爾的政治哲學仍落於鄂蘭所批評的忽略大眾公民的哲學，就應該重新思考現象學的還原方法如何不僅屬於哲學家小眾自己精神人格轉化的事。

Regarding discussions about Husserl’s political issues, there are some studies from the points of view: technization of government, Husserl’s position of war, and his conception of community etc. This article will refer to them by the following procedure: Firstly, three representative secondary literatures are interpreted and ordered, by way of that the first literature reflects on the genetic meaning of the technization of government according to Husserl’s phenomenology, the second requires the origin of that genetic meaning through the phenomenological reduction, and understands the origin as the original Political that implies the ideal of “community of love,” based upon which the third develops the ideal of the state. Secondly, a comment is to be made on these discourses. Since Husserl’s idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science aims to develop a pure phenomenology, a question will be raised through the whole article: Can and how politics like the other practical sciences, say ethics, have a position in Husserl’s phenomenology? How can politics build a proper relation with the pure phenomenology? This answer will be obtained based on the discussion of the key question: How can both of the transcendental and natural attitudes be in accordance? Is the method of epoché able to solve this question? I will see some analogy between Husserl and Arendt. That means, Arendt originally also applies the method of epoché to her political thinking. But, if we regard Husserl’s political philosophy still as that which Arendt criticizes to neglect the plural civils, we should reconsider how the phenomenological reduction would not fall into the private business of a personal transformation of the singular philosopher.