本研究探討環保抗爭與綠黨得票率的關係，本文的出發點是環保抗 爭是否有助於綠黨得票率的提升？綠黨以環境保護為主要訴求，照理 說，綠黨應該在受到環境汙染（特別是工業汙染）的地區擁有較高的得 票率，但就台灣經驗而言，似乎不是這樣，綠黨的選情持續低迷，那麼 是什麼原因造成的？本研究蒐集1987 至2009 年間所有的環保抗爭事 件，詳加分類之後，運用地理資訊系統(GIS) 與空間分析方法，將抗爭 定位到鄉鎮，結合2012 年立委選舉綠黨的政黨得票率，探討其間的關 係。研究發現，環保抗爭與綠黨得票率間的關係不大，倒是與民進黨的 得票率有明顯相關，主要的原因是民進黨吸納了環保抗爭激起的政治能 量，抗爭愈多的地方反而變成民進黨的票倉，無助於綠黨的發展。其次 本文區分環境抗爭類型，比較綠黨、民進黨、國民黨的得票情形，發現 工業汙染與鄰避等有明確汙染源或標的抗爭的出現，與民進黨得票率間 有正向的關係。至於與生態有關的抗爭，因為理念程度高，沒有立即與 直接的受害者，不利於選舉動員，與民進黨得票率的關係是負向。至於 反核、噪音、其他汙染的抗爭，或者標的渙散、或者偏向理念宣導、或 者抗爭地與發生地距離過遠，對民進黨的得票率沒有助益。國民黨的得 票情形則剛好相反，工業汙染抗爭發生較多的地區，國民黨的得票率越 低。同時也發現，綠黨的主要發展仍在都會區，符合後物質主義的一些假設；最後，鄰近效應的影響不容忽視，顯示鄰近地區的互動或資訊傳遞扮演重要角色。

We investigate the relationship between environmental protests and parties’ vote shares. Whether environmental protest contributes to the vote share of the Green party? As Green party emphasizes environment protection, people who suffer from environmental pollution is more likely to endorse Green Party. If not, what are the factors behind the situation? We collect and categorize environmental protest data between 1987 and 2009. Applying GIS and spatial analysis, we collapse protest events by township and issue types. Combining legislative election results, we analyze the influence of environmental protests on the vote shares of parties. The empirical result shows that anti-industrial pollution protests exert the most significant effect on party vote share but the influence varies across parties. First, anti-industrial pollution protest is not significantly associated with the vote share of Green Party. The larger the number of anti-industrial pollution protest in a township, the higher the DPP’s vote share and the lower the KMT’s vote share. For the other types of environmental protests, we do not find comparable effect of protests on vote sharing. In this article we also find that it is socio-economic status of a township rather than the intensity of environmental protest that affect the electoral performance of Green party. Finally, the empirical model also demonstrates the significance of neighborhood effect on parties’ vote shares.