台灣於2014年開始實施十二年國教。其中分發制度的志願序設計 是引發學生和家長爭議的主要焦點之一。本文建立一個十二年國 教分發制度下的簡化賽局模型,比較納入志願序作為入學比序依據 的新制, 以及傳統填志願依成績分發的舊制。我們首先描述學生可 能的因應策略, 並刻劃在新舊分發制度下的純策略均衡。接著我們 以一個典型的混合均衡為例,分別說明在新制下可能的長期均衡結 果。我們發現, 最好的學生不受影響, 然後大致上會依照成績由優 至劣對學生產生由弊至利的各種影響。另外, 學校錄取的學生組成 會更多樣化, 成績較差的學生開始有可能進入第一志願的學校, 並 且缺額的情況將可能出現在傳統分發制度下從來不會發生的學校。

The government in Taiwan implemented 12-year compulsory education in 2014. Among its several measures, the newly adopted student assignment mechanism caused intense debate in Taiwan. In this paper, we construct a model in which students submit their school choices and characterize the pure Nash equilibria under both the new and the original system. We then provide an example with a typical mixed equilibrium to illustrate its welfare and efficiency outcome. We find that, under the new system, the best students are not affected while the second-tier students lose and the last-tier students gain. Under the new system, schools will be more likely to admit students from all tiers, although all schools may have vacancies now that only occurred in the least preferred schools under the old system.