內容摘要：本文旨在釐清海德格《存在與時間》中對「良知」與「罪責」的意義。論文區分為四個章節，首先（壹）在簡短地介紹本文的主題之後，我們接著討論海德格實存論的死的意義（貳）。海德格對實存論的死的闡明是在此在的全體存在的視域之下來進行，並且將此在的全體存在理解為從出生到死亡之間。接著（參）本文討論實存論的良知與罪責。良知的呼喚要我們脫離非本真的自我而走向本真的自我，罪責則開顯了我們實存論的無性。據筆者的觀察，前期的海德格對良知與罪責的討論，仍然維持在實存論的唯我論的立場。最後（肆）本文總結海德格的洞見，並且討論實存論的唯我論所可能隱含的幾個可能的問題，特別是關於絕對的他者與此在的辯證法的問題。

Abstract: The paper aims at clarifying the meanings of conscience and guilt in Heidegger’s Being and Time. It is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of the paper (section one), we discuss the meaning of Heidegger’s existential death (section two). Heidegger’s explication is framed under the perspective of Dasein’s whole-being (Ganzsein), which is understood by him as Dasein’s between birth and death. Then (section three) I discuss his existential conscience and guilt. Conscience calls us away from our inauthentic self and towards authentic self. Guilt reveals our existential nothingness. Heidegger’s explication of the nature of conscious and guilt is according to my observation still under the perspective of his existential solipsism. Finally in the last section (section four) I conclude Heidegger’s insight and discuss some possible problems, especially about the problems of absolut other and dialects of Dasein, that imply in Heidegger’s existential solipsismus.