本文檢視臺灣在2005-2007 年選區重劃過程中的政黨政治，分析國 民黨、民進黨兩大黨為何無法在各縣市通過對他們最有利的重劃版本。 理論上，選區重劃案的政黨色彩，某種程度取決於法令規定對決策者、 決策機構的黨派組成及行動順序的限制。以本研究個案來說，選區重劃 案必須經過四個階段：首先為縣市選舉委員會，其次是中選會，第三為 立法院，最後是立法院長與行政院長的協商。本文於每階段一一考量有 關法令約制、決策機關組成和行動順序的細節內涵與效果。此外，本 文檢視彰化縣、臺中縣與屏東縣例子，以說明共識型、地方選委會優勢 型、政黨衝突型等三種選區重劃常見的型態。就公共行政而言，本文的 分析架構提供一種評估不同改革案的方式。就政治發展的角度來說，此 分析架構推論，未來選區重劃時本文指出的關鍵因素若有所改變，尤其 若臺灣出現一致政府而非分立政府，則其過程與結果或許將相當不同於 2005-2007 年的案例。

This paper examines partisan politics in the redistricting process in Taiwan in 2005-2007 to explain why neither major party was able to obtain its best plan in every city or county. Theoretically, the degree of partisanship depends on the extent to which guidelines constrain decision makers, the partisan composition of decision making bodies, and the sequence of action. In this specific case, there were four stages. Redistricting plans went through local election commissions, the Central Election Commission, the legislature, and negotiations between the speaker and the premier. At each stage, the effects of the guidelines, composition, and sequence are considered in detail. In addition, three counties are examined, illustrating the three common patterns: consensus, dominance by the local election commission, and partisan conflict. From a public policy standpoint, the framework presented in this paper provides a way to assess how various reform proposals would alter the incentive and constraints facing various actors. Politically, the framework suggests how future redistricting may differ from the 2005-2007 round, especially if Taiwan has unified government.