此文探討大陸銀行為何特權消費高，特權消費與銀行績效間有何關聯， 以及甚麼機制可有效監督特權消費。研究結果顯示CEO 權力大，CEO 有政 治關聯，大銀行，老銀行的特權消費比較高。雖然我們沒發現特權消費與職 位鞏固之間有明顯的關聯，但特權消費高的銀行績效較差，且特權消費與績 效間的關係在特別強調地位的銀行(如大銀行，CEO 權力大的銀行)中更明 顯。特權消費高的銀行風險承擔程度也比較高，這樣的銀行比較會從事績效 波動高的相關活動。在高特權消費的銀行，董事會多元性較低，但董事會專 業性卻比較高。在高特權消費的銀行中，無相關業務經驗的董事較少，較少 女性董事，董事平均年齡較老。在高特權消費銀行，普遍存在的大規模董事 會，與高學歷、具學術背景的董事，這些都無法有效監督特權消費，唯有性 別多元化的董事會才能有效監督特權消費。

This paper investigates why perks are high, how perks are related to bank performance, and which monitoring function works in the Chinese banking sector. Results show that stronger CEO power, CEOs with political ties, larger banks, and older banks are all associated with higher perks. Although we are unable to find a significant relationship between perks and entrenchment, banks with high perks underperform versus those with low perks. The relationship between perks and performance is more pronounced for banks that are prone to emphasize status, such as large banks and banks with high CEO power. Banks with high perks are also associated with high risk-taking and are more likely to be engaged in events that have a high variability of performance. Boards of directors in high-perk banks are less diversified, but surprisingly, more professional. Evidence also presents that fewer directors with unaffiliated business experience, fewer female directors, and older directors serve on the boards of high-perk banks. Large boards and directors with a higher education or academic background, which are common in high-perk banks, fail to efficiently monitor perks. Gender-diverse boards provide better monitoring.