海德格於《尼采》（1961）以存有理解為基礎接續《存有與時間》對存 有和時間的追問，論點則由《存有與時間》存有者的存有、向來屬我性 （Jemeinigkeit）的個體性轉向存有者整體（das Seiende im Ganzen）、存有本身， 因而出現與前期哲學有所延續卻又不同的關係。 透過對尼采永恆輪迴學說與強力意志的詮釋，海德格於《尼采》提出 「瞬間的永恆（Ewigkeit des Augenblicks）」。如此意義下的永恆與時間及自 身性有關，而且和《存有與時間》的瞬間（Augenblick）概念及自主式的自 由具有某種相似性，因此本文以《尼采》為主，並藉助《存有與時間》的相 關論述，探討海德格有關瞬間和永恆的概念，以及瞬間、永恆與人的可能 關係。

In Nietzsche (1961), Heidegger investigates the questions of being and time based on a common base, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), referring to the understanding of being. But his theses shifts from the being of beings and the individual of (in each case) mine (Jemeinigkeit) in Being and Time to the beings on the whole and being as such in Nietzsche. In Nietzsche, Heidegger has a new definition of eternity (the “Now” falling back into the Self), and seeks the eternity of the Augenblick (blink) by ways of interpreting Nietzsche’s concepts of Will to Power and Eternal Return. I argue that the new meaning of eternity which relates to time and the self (Selbst, Selbstheit) is similar to the concept of Augenblick (blink) and autonomic freedom (Freiheit der Selbstständigkeit) in Being and Time. So, mainly based on Nietzsche and with the aid of Being and Time, this paper aims to investigate Heidegger’s concepts of Augenblick and eternity as well as their relation with human beings.