本文以探討比較不同類型半總統制下國會的監督作爲，並以 Shugart and Carey的「總統—議會」及「總理—總統」兩次類型爲比 較差異的理論推論思考基礎，再依Polsby之概念，提出「表演-實作」 的監督傾向光譜，以爲評量本文所比較代表「總統-議會」制的台灣 立法院，及代表「總理-總統」制的法國國民議會監督作爲傾向的依 據。本文再依兩類型的理論邏輯，分別選出「退撫制度」、「軍購問題」， 及「核能核電」等三議題，來探測檢視台、法兩國國會的監督作爲。
台、法兩國會在三議題於政黨一致的觀察期間，在7項相關職權 所展現的監督作爲是：台灣立法院較屬於「表演傾向」，法國國民議會 則展現較強的「實作傾向」。不過，兩國會之監督也有共同困境；本文 最後說明此研究的限制及對實務可能的貢獻。

This paper explores and compares the parliamentary oversight behaviors in the different sub-types of semi-presidentialism, namely Shugart & Carey’s president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism. It further transforms Polsby’s concept of a legislative performance spectrum into a “show-work” spectrum, and then utilizes this to evaluate and compare the oversight behaviors of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan, which represents “president- parliamentarism”, and the “premier-presidential” French National Assembly. Based on the theoretical logic of the two sub-types, this paper also selects three issues to compare and examine the oversight behaviors in Taiwan and France, namely the public servant pension system, military acquisition and procurement, and nuclear power. The time span covered by this research is the period between 2007 and 2012, in which both countries experienced a unified government. Moreover, seven jurisdictional powers that are crucial to the exercise of parliamentary oversight functions are subject to detailed data collection and substantial comparison.
This paper finds that the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan is leaning toward a “show” style of oversight behavior, while the French National Assembly is more of a “work” style. However, both parliaments encounter some similar constraints in conducting their oversight duties. The paper, in conclusion, illustrates its research limits and plausible contributions to parliamentary affairs as well as semi-presidential studies.