本文建立一個三國兩廠商的出口模型，在模型中，擁有創新製程技 術之本國廠商，擬將其專利技術授權給另一生產同質產品之外國廠 商，兩者同時將產品全數出口到第三國市場從事Cournot競爭，技 術專利出口之本國政府對其出口產品實施出口政策。本文發現，當本國廠商的原始邊際成本大於外國廠商時，若創新程度夠大，則本 國政府的最適政策爲對出口課稅。此外，本國也可能同時有兩個使 本國福利極大的出口稅或出口補貼率。最後，本國政府對出口課稅 可能使被授權之外國廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆提高，造成「三贏」的局面。

We develop a model a la Brander and Spencer (1985) to discuss the optimal export policy of the domestic country when a domestic firm intends to license its innovated process technology to a foreign firm. The findings in this paper are as follows. First, if the reduction of the foreign firm’s marginal cost due to licensing is large enough, an export tax is called for when the initial marginal production cost of the domestic firm is greater than that of the foreign firm. Second, under some parametric conditions, two different subsidy rates can achieve the same maximum welfare. Moreover, imposing an optimal tax on the domestic export may improve the welfare of all countries.