牟宗三曾表示儒家哲學不能局限在道德，而亦須對存在問題有所交代。本文所論即對此而發，探討儒家哲學有何理論需要去關涉事物的存在問題。文章分為兩大部分（第貳、參兩節），先從「原意」的角度，指出儒家（牟宗三眼中以《論語》、《孟子》、《中庸》、《易傳》為核心的儒家）本就有意對存在問題作交代。再從「理論」的角度指出：（1）（對儒家來說）道德實踐如非荒謬，必得承認道德關懷的對象為「不空」（非如幻如化）。（2）在牟氏的「道德的形上學」裏，對象之為「不空」由「仁心」的覺潤來保證。（3）這種「仁心」的創造作為「『妙萬物而為言』的運用的創造」、「成全事為一必然的實有而不只是一偶然的存在之創生」，實亦配得上「創造」之名。

Mou Zongsan thinks that Confucianism should deal with not only moral philosophy, but should also the issues of existence. This paper therefore aims at examining his view – is it necessary for Confucianism to deal with the issues of existence? The paper is divided into two parts. Firstly, we examine the pre-Qin classics which were considered by Mou as the canons of Confuncianism. These include the Analects, Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean and Yi Commentaries. We will see that these texts indeed address the issues of existence. Secondly, from the theoretical perspective, we argue that: (1) If moral practices are to be meaningful, they must depend on the existence of the objects they are concerned. (2) In Mou’s moral metaphysics, this existence is guaranteed by the moral mind’s intention. (3) Although this notion of “moral creation” by the moral mind is different from God’s creation, it still deserves the name of “creation”.