克里普克等人將個體本質歸於起源，遭遇到多方面的理論詰難，這可以視為亞里斯多德主義在當代形而上學研究中面臨的一個困境。個體本質實際就是亞里斯多德意義上第一實體的標準，對《範疇篇》與《形而上學》的研讀表明實體性形式即第一實體標準，不過其中尚有質料要素。起源必然性論題意識到質料在生物個體本質中的重要地位，但將其一元化，漠視結構性形式因素在其中甚至更高的比重。將起源理解為存在，進而將本質最終歸結為存在，這條策略也有悖經典亞里斯多德主義視域下的本質與存在觀念：存在是本質的現實化行動，本質則是存在這一行動的原則和規定，它們一般是分離的，不可將存在列為一個本質要素。就生物體而言，決定其「質的同一性」標準是物種形式，其「數的同一性」標準則由最初質料決定，後者不能為路易斯意義上的仿本論證所駁斥。依照亞里斯多德主義，毋寧說最初質料確定的是一個獨特的生命，生命形式則是由生物學家探索、發現得到的普遍物種基因，現實化於某一最初質料的生命形式就是之後形成的個體本質。貫徹以上亞里斯多德主義個體本質學說，不會導致同一生物體有多次生命歷程的荒謬推論，因為這一推論或者是循環論證，或者混淆了不同的同一性觀念，即令最初質料也有自身的起源。

Kripke and some others take its origin as individual essence, which faces theoretical objections in many perspectives. Such a phenomenon could be regarded as a severe obstacle to Aristotelism in contemporary metaphysical studies. As a matter of fact, individual essence is no other than the criterion of primary substance in the Aristotelian sense. An elaborate interpretation of Categories and Metaphysics shows that substantial form is the criterion of primary substance, merely with matter as one of its constituents. The necessity of origin thesis realizes that matter has important status in living individual essence, but exaggerates its importance up to monism, ignorant of the element of structural form’s even higher proportion of weight therein. Construing origin as existence, and further attributing essence to existence is also a strategy which contradicts the classical ideas of essence and existence from the view of classical Aristotelism. According to classical Aristotelism, existence is the actualizing action of essence while essence is the principle and stipulation of the action existence. Since essence and existence are generally separated, existence cannot be listed as an element of essence. As to an organism, the criterion, which determines its qualitative identity, is the form of species, whereas the one, which determines its numerical identity, is the initial matter. The latter cannot be falsified by a counterpart theoretic argument in the sense of David Lewis. In the eyes of an Aristotelist, it would rather be the case that the initial matter determines a unique life, the form of a life is a universal species gene explored and discovered by biologists, and the form of a life actualized in the initial matter would thus be the essence of the individual to come into being later. If one insists on the Aristotelist doctrine of individual essence illustrated above, she will not derive an absurd corollary that a life could have more than one course, for such an inference is either circular or confusing different conceptions of identity, since even initial matter has its own origin.