尼采終其一生駁斥理性的量化趨勢，致力於思考另類的存在維度， 即「質」(Qualität)。針對諸如「形式」、「量」等支配著形上學的範 疇，尼采將一切現象回溯至一種更為原本的「質」，作為存在的內涵。 可是此種「質」與形上學所關注的「特質」、「性質」、「本質」等 概念不盡相同，它根植於個別的身體自我，落實在生活時間以及身體 運動上。借助此種「化為肉的質」，尼采構想「舞蹈」作為理想運動 模式，企圖就生活態度來引發一種整體轉化，經由實行一種「大肯定」 (das große Ja) 來解除虛無主義的魔咒。本論文宗旨在於圍繞這幾個環節，試圖釐清尼采的身體論所涉及的倫理學意義。

During his entire life-time Friedrich Nietzsche harshly criticized the quantifying bias of reason, striving to think about another dimension of existence, viz. “quality”. In opposition to metaphysical categories such as “form” and “quantity”, Nietzsche tried to reduce all phenomena to a primordial “quality” as purport of existence. Yet this “quality” is not to be confounded with metaphysical notions such as “quale”, “nature”, or “essence”. Instead, it is rooted in the bodily self, being realized by living temporality and body motion. By means of such an “embodied quality”, Nietzsche conceived of “dancing” as an ideal manner of body motion, thus trying to induce a fundamental transformation within man’s attitude towards life; by way of a “great yes” he wanted to get rid of the scourge of nihilism. Focusing on these issues, this paper intends to elucidate the relation between the living body and ethics, intrinsic to Nietzsche’s thought.