本論文為一政策導向的論文，主要在探討「馬習會」後，國人何以對兩岸政治談判的支持度急速下滑？是因為馬總統在習近平面前不夠捍衛臺灣主權與尊嚴，擔心其無法勝任未來的兩岸政治談判？還是習近平的表現讓臺灣人民覺得其不可信任，未來兩岸如果走到政治深水區，臺灣不可能從習近平手中獲得什麼好處，而影響到臺灣人民對兩岸政治談判的意願？為了回答此一問題，本論文透過兩次民調，探討國人對「馬習會」的評價，並比較「馬習會」前後，臺灣民眾對兩岸政治談判的看法。研究結果發現，「馬習會」前贊成兩岸政治談判的民眾高達67.3%，不贊成13.7%；但是「馬習會」後贊成52.6%，不贊成34.2%；兩相比較，贊成兩岸政治談判下降14.7%；不贊成則提高20.5%，一來一往相差35.2%。為何如此？本論文透過「二元勝算對數模型」分析發現，主要問題出在習近平，因為對習不信任感增加，而降低兩岸政治談判的意願；也出在民眾整體感覺「馬習會」對臺灣比較不利，既然如此，進一步談判兩岸政治關係的意願當然會下降。這樣的研究結果，不僅具有學術意義，亦具有政策指導功能，是為本論文最大的貢獻。

This policy-oriented paper examines Taiwanese public opinion regarding cross Strait political negotiation before and after the Ma-Xi Meeting and why support for negotiation dropped precipitously following the meeting. Was the drop due to public perceptions that Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou didn’t sufficiently protect Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity in front of China’s leader Xi Jinping? Or did Xi’s performance at the meeting cause many Taiwanese to believe he is not trustworthy and that moving into the “deep water zone” of political negotiation with the Xi-led regime in Beijing would bring no benefit to Taiwan? To analyze this question, this study uses public opinion surveys regarding cross-Strait political negotiation conducted before and after the Ma-Xi Meeting to assess the meeting’s influence on Taiwanese attitudes toward cross-Strait political negotiation. The surveys show that prior to the summit, 67.3% of Taiwanese approved of cross-Strait political negotiation while 13.7% opposed it. After the meeting, support for political negotiation fell to 52.6% while opposition rose to 34.2%. Binary logit model analysis suggests that increased distrust of Chinese president Xi Jinping following the summit and perceptions that the leadership meeting was relatively unfavorable to Taiwan decreased support among Taiwanese for Taipei to engage in political negotiation with Beijing. These findings have important implications for policy-making on both sides regarding cross-Strait political negotiation.