鑒於過往的競租文獻，忽略了個別競租者可以同時使用多種不同方式 來相互競逐利益的可能性，同時參酌 Hausken（2012）有關於進行涉及生 產層面問題的競租分析時，宜選用生產衝突模型為討論架構的建議。本文 藉由調整生產衝突模型的部分設定，在個人面對資源限制下，除了可以將 有限的資源配置於生產和競租活動以外，還可選擇將部分資源投入隱匿產 出逐利活動的情況下，建立一個納入隱匿產出策略的生產衝突競租模型來 從事競租分析。分析結果發現，政府提高對於隱匿產出活動的查緝以及懲 罰強度，將導致產出隱匿水準的下降以及均衡競租投入水準的提高，同時 均衡產出水準、個人效用以及社會福利水準則是會因此降低。本文的上述 分析發現顯示，在我們所建立的生產衝突競租分析架構下，當政府當局基 於抑制非法活動、維護公平正義或其他理由而提高對於產出隱匿活動的查 緝以及懲罰強度時，就效率觀點而言，反而會導致個人效用與社會福利水 準因為此一變動而降低。

Previous papers on rent-seeking tend to overlook the possibility that individual rent seeker can seek rent by many different devices. As suggested by Hausken (2012), the production and conflict model is a better choice to analyze rent seeking activities pertaining to production. This paper adjusts the setup of ordinary production and conflict model. We establish a production and conflict rent-seeking model with hidden output to conduct the rent-seeking analysis. We find that the strengthening of authority investigation or punishment of illegal output hiding activities will decrease output hiding level, increase rent seeking input, and at the same time decrease individual output, utility and social welfare. Our finding shows that the strengthening of authority investigation or punishment of illegal output hiding activities aiming to restrain illegal activities or maintain justice will have negative impact on individual utility and social welfare.