從對告子把人性分類之反駁，孟子藉本心倫理能力之普遍性，證成了共 同人性之概念，解決告子人性論因缺普遍人性而產生缺乏倫理自主性、普遍 規範以及責任之困難。在重組《孟子》之過程中，筆者先建立起本心之平等， 乃共同人性之基礎，並說明規範之法理基礎在於以普遍性建立其正當性，再 在「一本」對〈桑民〉詮釋中，找出共同人性與普遍規範之互為說明之關係， 因而即可證明普遍規範乃根源自本心。因而，「君子所性，仁義禮智根於心」 之說，從孟子的一個主張，成為一個被證成者，而本心值得一立法主體之名。 本文用力頗深之本心之期許以及愉悅理義，乃是進一步證成本心能力之主 體，與共同人性與普遍規範之關係。

In the rejection of Gaozi’s classification of human nature, Mencius justified the concept of common human nature through the universality of the ethical ability of the original mind, and gave a solution for the difficulties of Gaozi’s theory, that is, for the difficulties of lack of spontaneity, of universal norm and responsibility produced from the lack of common human nature. In the restructure of the argument in Mencius I explain that the equality of the original mind is the base of common human nature, and that the legal foundation of a norm is its rationality because of its universality, and that the interrelation between common human nature and universal norm can be founded in the interpretation of “zhēng mín”（〈烝民〉）according to One Principle（一本）, in order to justify that the universal norm comes from the original mind. The statement that the human nature talked by gentlemen means that norms have root in the original mind is at first an assertion, but now becomes a justified, and therefore the original mind is worth to a name as a lawgiver subject. The relation between the concept of original mind and common human nature and universal norm can be further justified from the concept of the hope and pleasure as an intentional activity of the original mind.