本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先，本文將以Emma Borg 為極 小主義之代表，釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化 的核心意義，並被賦予三種特色：直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論 證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字 詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字 詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變，因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其 次，本文論證，抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物，因此難以有 真假值可言。

Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained.