在談論道德責任（moral responsibility）歸屬時，一種常被接受的看法是： 某人對某事具有道德責任，若且唯若某人在自由意志下，促使了某事的發 生。換句話說，若是人無從避免去做一件道德上應受譴責的事情，則不被歸 屬道德責任。而朱熹（1130-1200）以心統性情的義理架構，作為其倫理思 想的心性論基礎，這樣的系統究竟能否歸屬道德責任？當代學人對此有許多 歧見。他們的意見為何產生衝突？朱子心性論可以回應道德責任歸屬嗎？這 是本文意欲探究的重點。 本文的結論是：當代學人各條研究進路之糾結，大致可以視為相容論與 不相容論之爭的中國式展開；對此大哉問，形上學一日不得解，便一日沒有 答案。然而在上述糾結之外，若還有回應問題的空間，或許在於以本體工夫 論，兼及體驗論的視野，將心詮釋為性情的突現（emergence），去照應涵養 省察、格物致知、克己主敬等思想─進而能將Peter van Inwagen 的話改寫 為一種中國式的言說：心性情之間，別有一種神秘的工夫。

A commonly held view concerning moral responsibility is that someone has a moral responsibility for some action if and only if someone makes actions freely. In other words, if someone cannot avoid doing actions to be morally condemned, it is not attributable to moral responsibility. Can Zhu Xi’s theory of mind and ethical thoughts─xin-tong-xing-qing 心統性情─respond to the attribution of moral responsibility? Scholars have different opinions and to what extent their disagreement ranges is the focus of this paper. The conclusion of this paper is that the intertwining of these research approaches can be regarded as philosophical problems of the Chinese style concerning compatibilism and incompatibilism. This problem cannot be solved unless its metaphysical problem is dealt with in the first place. However, in addition to the above solution, perhaps we can see xin 心 as emergence of xing-qing 性情, and imagine a special vision of ontological gong-fu 工夫 and experience, taking care of thoughts like han-yang-xing-cha 涵養省察, ge-wu-zhi-zhi 格物致知, ke-ji-zhu-jing 克己主敬. We then adapt the famous statement of Peter van Inwagen as follows: “there is mysterious gong-fu between xin and xing-qing.”