本文探討美國產險業CEO 更迭對再保險需求的影響。實證結果顯示，有CEO 更迭的 保險公司在CEO更迭後更有可能增加再保險的需求。本文進一步分析，在CEO更迭後， 非例行性（強迫性）CEO 更迭較沒有更迭的保險公司更有可能增加再保險的需求，但 例行性（任意性）CEO 更迭較沒有更迭的保險公司則不太會改變對再保險的需求。一 個可能的解釋是，來自非例行性（強迫性）更迭的新任CEO 的保險公司更有可能增加 再保險需求是為穩定盈餘與減少風險以確保新任CEO 的工作安全性。此外，在CEO 更迭後，相互保險的組織型態與CEO 更迭的交乘項與再保險需求為負相關。研究結果 顯示，在2002 年沙賓法案通過後，保險公司CEO 更迭與再保險需求無關。本研究結 果指出CEO 更迭顯著影響再保險需求。

This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover on reinsurance demand in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry. Our evidence shows that insurers with CEO turnover are more likely to increase reinsurance demand after CEO turnover. More detailed analyses indicates that insurers with non-routine (forced) CEO turnover are more likely to increase reinsurance than insurers without CEO turnover, but insurers with routine (voluntary) CEO turnover are not likely to change reinsurance policies after CEO turnover. One possible explanation for these results is that an insurer with a new CEO resulting from non-routine (forced) CEO turnover is more likely to increase demand for reinsurance to stabilize earnings and reduce risk to protect the job security of the new CEO. The evidence shows that the interaction effect between mutual form and CEO turnover is negatively related to reinsurance demand after CEO turnover. Finally, our results also show that insurers with CEO turnover are not related to reinsurance demand after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. The overall results of this study indicate that CEO turnovers have a significant impact on the demand for reinsurance.