再協商條款與傳統法律之契約不可變更的觀念有所衝突，衍生於跨國生產分享 計劃之時間長金額大的特殊性質。公營事業民營化後，許多重大的基礎建設都採BOT 方式進行，其契約期間也很長，對未來的各種狀況也無法在訂約時予以預見，自然 會引用跨國契約中的再協商條款以保障雙方的權利。本文以台灣台北港BOT 專案契 約為研究對象，探討國內契約因再協商條款的出現可能衍生的利益分配問題。研究 發現台北港BOT 專案契約因再協商條款的存在的確提供台北港專案公司免於長期受 政府挾持（holdup）的威脅，卻也因此產生明顯的代理問題（agency problem）發 生的可能，同時也未考慮因再協商條款所造成契約價值的改變。本研究的發現可提 供國內未來訂定BOT 長期契約時，選擇首選約定結果的參考。

The concept of renegotiation that was derived from the international production sharing contracts whose periods are usually quite lengthy is in conflict with the principle of the sanctity of traditional law. Following the trend of privatization in Taiwan, many infrastructure construction projects have been undertaken by private enterprises through an assorted number of BOT project consortiums. Due to the long contract periods of these BOT projects, various unforeseen uncertainties have been occurring which had not been anticipated during the initial signing of contracts, and hence, renegotiation talks have on numerous occasions been necessary for these BOT contracts, like many international contracts, to protect the financial interests of all parties concerned. In this paper, the Taipei port BOT contract is investigated to examine whether the possible difficulties of interest disequilibria, resembling several international contracting impediments, have also appeared in this particular contract. Certain aspects of this BOT contract seem to ascertain that governmental delays are to extent protected by the renegotiation provisions in this contract. Furthermore, some unverifiable terms in the contract have yet to be clarified, and, thus, agency problems seem quite likely to occur during this contract period. On the other hand, the possibly increased value of this contract due to these renegotiation provisions has not been evaluated, either. Thus, we believe that these findings could perhaps be very beneficial and informative at the signing of such contracts to maintain the first-best outcomes.