有關墮胎的道德性與合法性的議題，一直是道德哲學與法律哲學中 爭執不休的重要問題。傳統的論辯主要聚焦在「胎兒是不是人」與「胎 兒是否擁有道德權利和法律權利」的爭議上，然而墮胎的關鍵爭議是否 如傳統論述所言，主要涉及胎兒道德地位與法律地位的爭辯，以及因此 衍生有關權利與利益的討論？對此，德沃金提出不同的看法。他認為在 支持與反對墮胎的傳統論述背後，其實隱藏雙方共享的價值基礎，即雙 方都肯認胎兒有人類生命的內在價值，他稱為「超然性觀點」，而傳統 論述則是一種「衍生性觀點」，並據此建構出對墮胎問題的完整論述。 本文嘗試以德沃金的墮胎論證作為主要研究對象，審視其理論背後 涉及的深刻問題。本文首先簡要考察墮胎議題的傳統論辯，分別檢視湯 姆森（Judith Thomson）與芬尼斯（John Finnis）二人的不同看法（貳）； 接著分析德沃金的論證，審視他對墮胎道德性與合法性問題的主要論點 （參）；然後從人性尊嚴（human dignity）角度切入，藉由考察德沃金 的人性尊嚴觀，並檢視 Beyleveld 和 Brownsword 對此概念的比較分 析與主張，探討雙方論證所展現的自由主義觀點及其差異，繼而審視國 內兩位法學者的不同論點，並對德沃金的墮胎論證提出一些反省（肆）； 最後則是結論（伍）。

In legal and moral philosophy, the dispute about the morality and legality of abortion is always a controversial and important issue. The traditional debate usually focuses on questions about ‘whether fetus is a person’ and ‘whether it has moral and legal rights’. Nevertheless, Ronald Dworkin proposes an account different from the traditional one. He argues that the traditional rival arguments - the pro-life and pro-choice arguments - in fact share a common ground, that is, both admit that fetus has the intrinsic value of human life. Dworkin calls it ‘the detached view’ as distinguished from the traditional ‘derivative view’. This essay attempts to critically review Dworkin’s abortion argument and the profound controversies behind it. Part II examines the classical debate of Judith Thomson and John Finnis. Part III surveys Dworkin’s main arguments about the morality and legality of abortion. Part IV compares his version of human dignity with that of Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, and then articulates the central issues implied in their arguments about dignity. Finally, Part V briefly discusses three issues worthy of further articulation in Dworkin’s abortion argument.