本文嘗試比較兩個發展程度類似且都被視作是東亞生產性福利體 制的臺灣與韓國，解釋為何在民主化後韓國為何能夠相對順利且快速 地進行社會投資的轉型，而臺灣為何不行。不同於Bonoli 的理論觀 點，本文嘗試將三個因素納入分析，壓縮現代性、制度結構遺緒和偶 發事件。本文假設兩國民主化後在面臨壓縮現代性時，都以建立和再 制度化傳統社會保障體系以解決舊社會風險和爭取政治支持；然而， 兩者卻在社會投資轉型過程中，因為不同的歷史制度結構遺緒的限制 下，有著不同的步調。臺灣在國家財稅能力和改革能力受到限制的 情況下，政治行動者在面臨新社會風險時無法有效地將社會支出導引 至積極性社會政策。相反地，韓國未成熟的社會保障體以及1997 年 的亞洲金融危機，使得國家有充裕的財政空間和改革的機會之窗， 能夠讓政治行動者利用積極性社會政策回應新社會風險以及爭取女 性和其他弱勢族群的支持。結果即是韓國目前是逐漸朝向「生產性 （productive）－保障性（protective）」的方向，而臺灣則是著重於保 障性社會政策。

This article aims to compare the social investment turns in two Productivist welfare states, Taiwan and (South) Korea, with a similar economic level, to illustrate why Korea could and Taiwan could not transform welfare system into social investment states. In contrast Bonoli’s perspective, we argue that compressed modernity, institutional legacies and contingencies should be taken into account. Although Taiwan and Korea both faced compressed modernity and prioritised traditional social protection systems to deal with old social risks and vie for political supports, they have different speeds and paths of social investment turn due to different national institutional legacies. In Taiwan, the state’s capacities of finance and reform were severely constrained by its institutional legacies. Therefore, political actors could not channel social expenditure from protective social policies into active social policies.By contrast, Korea’s immature social protection system and the 1997 Asian financial crisis not only led to higher financial capacity but also provided opportunities which helped political actors to introduce active social policies to deal with new social risks and vie for political supports from female and other vulnerable groups. As a result, Korea has been transforming towards Productive-Protective welfare state, but Taiwan still placed more emphasis on protective social policies.