篇名 | 獨家經銷下雙佔零售商領導訂價及其競爭方式 |
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卷期 | 20:2 |
並列篇名 | Retail-Stackelberg Duopoly Pricing and Competitive Strategies at Sole Distributorship |
作者 | 方惠毅 、 許竹筌 、 黃金樹 |
頁次 | 001-038 |
關鍵字 | 零售商領導 、 非線性需求函數 、 獨家經銷 、 Retail- Stackelberg 、 Non-linear Demand Function 、 Sole Distributorship |
出刊日期 | 201703 |
本文在兩家製造商與兩家零售商的通路以獨家經銷架構下,探討零售商領導訂價方式決定 的議题。相對於過去的文獻,本文係在固定彈性的非線性需求函數設定下,來進行探討,並得 到下述三個主要結果:1.在已知零售商進行價格競爭的情況下,零售商探取成本加成訂價方式 較有利,而非一般文獻探用的零售利差訂價方式。2.在已知零售商進行銷售量競爭的情況下, 成本加成訂價方式亦為零售商最佳的訂價選擇。3.在零售商的訂價領導下,兩商品為替代性, 此時零售商將探取成本加成訂價方式,而零售商會進行銷售量競爭;兩商品若爲互補性時,零 售商將探取成本加成訂價方式,而零售商會進行價格競爭。
This paper examines issues related to pricing leadership of retailers of two manufacturers and two retailers under the structure of sole distributor channel. In contrast with literature review, this paper conducts discussion on the assumption of fixed and flexible non-linear demand function and concludes with three major findings as follows: 1. Under the known price competition between retailers, retailers adopt cost markup pricing and not margin pricing proposed by literature review. 2. Under the known sales volume competition between retailers, cost markup pricing is also the optimal choice. 3. When retailers compete for sales volume and adopt cost markup pricing, competition of retailers relate to the characteristics of products; if products of two retailers are alternative or independent goods, retailers will compete over sales volume and if the products are complementary goods, retailers will compete on pricing.