在以往的組織間學習文獻中，許多研究者探取溝通/互動的研究途徑，強調廠商藉由組織間關係 (inter^organizationrelationship, IORs)的互動，得以進行組織間學習並發展其技術能耐。不過，溝通/互動研究途徑 雖認為IORs中廠商互動程度愈高，廠商由聯盟取得的知識也就愈多，但沒有回答IORs如何發展有效率的互動； 簡單地說，這些文獻說明了廠商互動對知識移轉的影響，卻未建構一個能使知識有效率移轉的互動過程。因此， 如何透過經濟學的機制設計理論(The mechanism design theory)，為不完全契約架構下的知識移轉設計一自動執行 機制，使誠實履約成為IORs中廠商的均衡策略，才是IORs能否形成有效率知識移轉的重要課題。 本文利用機制設計理論，建構一 IORs知識移轉模型，在模型中，我們將知識移轉設為IORs廠商私人資訊 的函數，而與Chen and Liu(2007)的完全訊息模型不同的是，本文假設廠商間為不完全訊息。本文發現，（一)若 廠商在再協商階段宣告策略的條件聯合機率為線性獨立時，當IORs在顯示機制後進行再協商，不存在一預算平 衡的知識移轉函數，滿足廠商誠實宣告的誘因限制條件。（二)在「獨立條件」假設下，序貫機制存在一同時滿足 預算平衡、有效率決策及誘因限制條件之知識移轉函數，而此知識移轉函數即為AGV機制。

In the past research of inter-organization learning, the “communicative/interactive orientation” emphasizes that firms could learn knowledge and develop technology by ways of inter-organization relationships (IORs). Those literatures assume and conclude that the more interactions the more knowledge firms could learn through IORs. However, how to develop an efficient interaction through the IORs between firms remains unanswered. In short, though those existing literatures have explained the effects of firms' interaction on the knowledge transfer, they failed to design and provide an interactive process through which the knowledge can be efficiently transferred. Based on the mechanism design theory and under the framework of imperfect contracting, this paper designs an enforceable agreement under which all firms will truthfully implement the contracts in the process of the knowledge transfer. We found the followings. Firstly, when firms renegotiate after the revelation mechanism, it does not exist a budget balancing knowledge transfer function satisfying the incentive compatibility that make firms report truthfully. Secondly, there exists a knowledge transfer function satisfying the budget balance, efficiency, and incentive compatibility in the sequential mechanism. This knowledge transfer function is actually equivalent to the AGV(d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet(1979)) mechanism.