本文闡釋寇斯（Ronald H. Coase）所揭櫫廠商理論的精義。長期以來寇 斯教授分別以不同時期的論文，細說分明美國在20 世紀初期汽車產業結構， 深入研究通用汽車公司（GM）和費雪兄弟車體製造公司（FB），從長期契約 到垂直整合經典實例，透析美國1920 年代汽車產業生產供應鏈組織與合作關 係的穩定性，是因為兩造之間建立良好的契約，鞏固了供應鏈上下游的供需關 係，以符合對市場和利潤的預期。契約內涵主要包括產權交易、利潤分配、控 制經營權等現代公司治理的要項。本文綜論寇斯教授的產權整合案例，導引現 代公司治理之濫觴，分析除了財務重心之外，產權和人才的整合亦是公司治理 的重要內涵。體認寇斯教授的主張，經濟學者必須徹底揚棄不求證據而誤導研 究內涵的主觀邏輯方法，不再以不疑有他的態度或純以黑板模式的論理來治 學。寇斯教授呼籲經濟學的變革，應以掌握事實證據的研究基礎，將經濟學研 究帶回正軌成為真正的經濟科學。本文確認：企業組織的運作與治理，企業組 織的整併存在運作與治理機制；而治理的要素，就是契約內涵協議和信守的相 容性誘因。與寇斯理論相結合：廠商內部的協商與調和成本，極關重要；尤其 關係到具關鍵性的營運資源，這些資源的產權，在自願性的交易基礎上，可透 過協商談判建立彼此信賴的契約，促使產權所有者因能合理獲致權益報酬而進 入穩定的契約關係，或終至整併。

Based on the facts of American industrial organization in the decades from 1900 to 1920, this paper, following Professor Coase, delineates the integration between General Motors (GM) and Fisher Body (FB) due to their cooperative and contractual arrangements. It is found that Coase theory of the firm has implicitly incorporated the spirit of modern corporate governance. This paper concludes in three aspects. On corporate governance, improving governance structure for conducting internal and external business relationship is the key successful factor for cooperation. The governance arrangement through negotiation and practical experience on cooperation would therefore guarantee final integration. On industrial technology, its exchange for achieving competition by business operators would enhance the core competence by understanding the complementarity between upstream and downstream firms. On market dynamism, incentives to integration always stimulate business operators to discover the market niche. Thus the corporate governance and the contractual design would be the focus for integration mechanism in business practice. In the case of GM and FB, except for the subjective appealing for the market access by FB and expansive desire by GM, both were driven by the market, technology and contractual arrangement into the arena of integration.