在政府財政緊縮且社會經濟問題日趨複雜的狀況下，結合民間機 構的協力治理已成爲政府推動許多重大政策主要的模式，1990年代開 始興起的民營化的風潮下，將原本政府自行完成的業務工作移轉到民 間成爲許多國家政府相繼採取的作法，國內相關文獻大多聚焦於國營 事業或公有設施的民營化，關於政府將管制任務民營化時會產生何種 現象或效應，則鮮少有所關注。民間機構是否可以擔負管制者的角色， 根據政府既定的規範，做出專業公正的判斷，不無疑問。 本研究以有機驗證業務的民營化爲例，藉由主管機關、驗證機構 與學者專家等的訪談，探討有機驗證業務從政府移轉到民間時可能產 生的代理人問題，就驗證機構的隱藏行爲、獨立專業性及資訊公開等 議題進行深入的分析，並檢討主管機關目前所訂定的驗證規範，以及 監督管理的能量是否可以降低代理人問題的產生，並據此提出後續的 建議。主要的研究發現包括有結果導向的績效指標無法確實衡量驗證 的品質，驗證機構可能有投機的行爲，驗證機構的獨立專業性參差不 齊，組織型態也有很大的差異，且驗證機構資訊公開的範疇與效應也非常有限，無法產生預期的淘汰效果。最後，主管機關將管理驗證機 構的任務進一步交給專業的民間機構，產生了運用民間機構來管制管 制者的問題，未來政府應設法強化對於兩者的監督管理，包括培養專 業的人才、擴大並強化資訊公開等途徑。本研究亦提出對於委託代理 人理論的反思，主張委託人本身的不當認知與政治考量對於管制政策 的目標與效果可能帶來負面的影響，未來相關研究可將此議題納入分 析。

Faced with increasing fiscal stress and complex social and economic problems, the government tends to work together with private entities in many areas to plan and implement major policies. Privatization, which refers to the transfer of government functions to the private sector, has been a popular approach taken since the 1990s. Most research on privatization focuses on the privatization of government assets and corporations, or of government services that are given to citizens. There is only a small amount of research that looks at what happens when the government privatizes its regulatory functions. This paper analyzes the agency problems that occured when the government transferred its responsibility for certifying organic products to private certification bodies. Interviews with government officials, managers in private certification bodies, and academic experts were conducted. Based on the current literature of principal-agent theory and outsourcing regulations, this paper builds a framework to evaluate the agency problem from two different aspects. On one side, the agency problem is thought to be related to the professional capability and independence of the private certification bodies, as well as the effect that reputation has in the market. On the other side, the design and performance measures taken by the government and their capability to monitor private certification bodies could be critical to the reduction of agency problems. Analysis of the interviews shows that there are variations between the different levels of independence and professional capability of the certification bodies, and that a lack of independence and professional capability may lead to agency problems. Moreover, the effect that reputation has in the market is not significant. It also proves difficult to dismiss low-quality certification bodies. The current regulations that use outcome-based measures to evaluate the performance of private certification bodies are not adequate for addressing agency problems. The government relies on another accreditation body in order to monitor private certification bodies, which may introduce additional agency problems. The government should think seriously about how to strengthen its oversight of both types of external bodies involved in organic certification.