本研究探討在考慮企業社會責任的情形下，對於連鎖加盟市場均衡與社會福利的影響。結 果顯示：加盟契約是以定額權利金的方式加盟，廠商越重視企業社會責任，有助於提高廠商自 身的產量與市場總產量，但會減少對手產量；但權利商與加盟商同時完全重視企業社會責任， 並非社會福利最佳的選擇，只有權利商或加盟商單方面的重視企業社會責任是廠商的最佳策略， 並可改善社會福利。

Taking into consideration of the corporate social responsibility (CSR), this paper discusses the implication of franchising on market equilibrium and social welfare. We found the followings. First, a corporate concerning its CSR would increase its quantity supplied, decreases its competitor’s supply quantity, and increases the overall market supply. This result is held for fixed-fee affiliation agreements. Second, when both of franchisors and franchisees simultaneously adopt the CSR strategy is not a social optimal due to the overproviding. A firm’s best strategy would be concerning its CSR unilaterally. The social welfare would be Pareto improved when one of them unilaterally concern the CSR.