1952年4月28日在臺北簽訂並於8月5日生效的《中華民國與日 本國間和平條約》，終結了中華民國與日本兩國間的戰爭狀態。 長期以來，學者從多方角度入手，探討這份和約的歷史與法律意 義，特別是對台灣歸屬權的定位問題。在和約簽訂過程的研究方 面，國內學者悉數將重點放在蔣介石與外交部長葉公超身上，西 方學者則多半偏重對杜勒斯(John Foster Dulles)的研究，幾乎無人 關注中華民國駐日代表圑圑長何世禮在其中的作用。事實上，何 世禮固然未親身參與中日和約的談判，卻在談判陷入僵局時，在 東京透過盟軍總部，成功向日本政府施加壓力，確保日本政府與 中華民國政府簽約。本文作為中華民國駐日代表圑研究的一個環 節，專門討論何世禮在韓戰爆發至中日和約簽訂前的角色與作用。

The Sino-Japanese Treaty, which was signed on April 28, 1952 and came into force on August 5, 1952, terminated the war status between Republic of China and Japan. Its historical and legal significance, especially the debate on the status of Taiwan derived from the Treaty, have been carefully examined by scholars for decades. Previous scholars nearly focused on the role of Chiang Kai-shek and Ye Gongchao in the negotiation of the Treaty, and the role of the Chinese Mission in Japan was neglected. Although the Chinese Mission in Japan did not directly participate in the negotiation of the Treaty, it successfully lobbied the General Headquarter in Tokyo to pressure Japan to sign the treaty with Republic of China rather than People’s Republic of China when the negotiation reached a stalemate. As a section of the research on the Chinese Mission in Japan, this paper examines the role of the Mission in the conclusion of the Treaty.