動物研究者在探討倫理議題時，經常會援引德希達（Jacques Derrida） 所謂悅納異己的觀念，但這樣的訴求經常面臨的質疑是：難道就算面對 （寄生）昆蟲，我們也必須無條件地接納，即使會因此造成自身的風險？ 由於在類似的質疑之中，往往是（寄生）昆蟲被挑出來作為動物倫理的 思考與實踐跨不過的門檻，本論文因此企圖探討，蟲在動物研究中的邊 陲位置，是否有助於我們進行更基進的思考，從而讓蟲也有被納入倫理 考量的機會。論文第一部分將以列維納斯（Emmanuel Levinas）的理論思 考昆蟲的倫理面貌，也將對比昆蟲如何以擬人的面貌出現在我們的文化 中；第二部分帶入德希達的動物倫理觀，討論諸如動物與人是「共死者」 （commourans）等概念，為何似乎也不能有效扭轉我們視昆蟲生命為無物 的傾向，並以凸顯昆蟲「可塑性」的藝術家法默（Tessa Farmer）其作品為 參照，思考昆蟲不被視為共死者的原因，是否正在於其強大的生存本 能；第三節則聚焦於可塑性此主題，指出人類社會既利用並依賴了昆蟲 的這種可塑性，就有倫理責任進一步去理解人與蟲之間的依存關係，並 主張重新思考「人的智性vs. 蟲的本能」這種高低位階的問題所在，期能 為辨識蟲的倫理面貌帶來一線希望。

Animal ethicists often draw on Jacques Derrida’s theory of hospitality to claim that nonhuman animals warrant our moral consideration. However, their advocacy is contested by questions like “Are we able to enter into a relation of care with insects or parasites which are inimical to human health?” In this paper, I will inquire why insects or parasites seem to constitute insurmountable barriers to our ethical behavior. The first section of this essay explores how insects, lacking a Levinasian notion of face which demands our response/ responsibility, are anthropomorphized in literature and mass culture, and how their appalling appearance thereby hinders our ethical access to them. The second section uses Derrida’s notion of commourans to explain why his philosophy also seems insufficient to make us include insects in our circle of moral concern. Using Tessa Farmer’s artwork as an example, I analyze how the plasticity of insects precludes us from seeing them as our co-diers. The third section begins with how humans have exploited the plasticity of insects to turn them into our companions of war. I also question the hypothesis that insects are eminently instinctive and devoid of intelligence. The paper concludes that the reconsideration of the “instinct/intelligence” dichotomy may pave the way for the deconstruction of anthropocentrism and, hopefully, enable us to recognize an insect’s “face” in the ethical sense.